

Message Text

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SUBJECT: ECAFE: REPRESENTATION ISSUES

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1. FOLLOWING ARE EXTRACTS FROM AMB. BENNETT'S SPEECH ON
KHMER REPRESENTATION, AS REQUESTED REFTEL:

2. BEGIN: ... CERTAINLY COMPLEXITIES OF ISSUE BEFORE US
ARE WORTHY OF A MORE BALANCED, CONSIDERED APPROACH THAN
THAT TAKEN BY THIS RESOLUTION (TO REPLACE GRK WITH GRUNK).
ONE MUST WONDER WHETHER ITS SPONSORS HAVE THOUGHT THROUGH
SERIOUSLY THE CONSEQUENCES OF WHAT THEY PROPOSE. HAVE
THEY ASKED THEMSELVES, FOR EXAMPLE, WHY IT IS THAT ONLY
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ONE EAST ASIAN MEMBER GOVERNMENT SUPPORTS SEATING PRINCE

SIHANOUK'S "GOVERNMENT"? ...

3. ARGUMENTATION MADE IN SUPPORT OF "ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNION OF CAMBODIA" SEEMS TO REST LARGELY ON PRINCIPLE THAT SINCE PRINCE SIHANOUK IS AT ITS HEAD, IT MUST BE THE TRUE GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA. BUT WITH ALL DUE RESPECT TO PRINCE SIHANOUK'S ONCE INTIMATE, OFTEN CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN EARLIER CAMBODIAN DEVELOPMENTS, I SUBMIT THAT WE CAN FIND SOME MORE OBJECTIVE AND RELIABLE CRITERIA FOR DECIDING WHO GOVERNS CAMBODIA. BETTER YET, CAN WE NOT ALLOW CAMBODIAN PEOPLE PRIVILEGE OF MAKING THIS DETERMINATION THEMSELVES? CAMBODIAN PEOPLE HAVE NOT, SO FAR AS I KNOW, GRANTED PRINCE SIHANOUK ANY IRREVOCABLE RIGHT TO RULE OVER THEM. NEITHER, I SUBMIT, SHOULD WE.

4. AMONG SPONSORS OF RESOLUTION BEFORE US ARE SOME OF THE MOST VOCAL SUPPORTERS OF PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF SOVEREIGN STATES. HAVE THEY FULLY CONSIDERED THE BASIC CONFLICT BETWEEN THIS PRINCIPLE AND SUPPORT FOR A RESOLUTION BY WHICH FOREIGNERS WOULD TELL THE KHMER PEOPLE WHO IS TO REPRESENT THEM IN THIS WORLD ORGANIZATION?

5. IT IS HARD TO CONCEIVE OF A MORE GROSS OR MORE BLATANT INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF A MEMBER STATE. IF THIS WERE TO BECOME A PRECEDENT, WHO IS TO SAY WHAT MEMBER STATE IN THIS ASSEMBLY MIGHT NOT BE THE NEXT VICTIM OF SUCH A PROCEDURE.

6. ALL OF US WHO HAVE BEEN READING THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS REPUTABLE JOURNALS SUCH AS LE MONDE OF PARIS AND THE GUARDIAN OF BRITAIN WHICH ENJOY A LARGE AUDIENCE HERE IN THE UN -- ARE AWARE THAT PRINCE SIHANOUK HIMSELF ADMITS THAT HE IS NOT IN CONTROL OF HIS "GOVERNMENT," AND THAT HIS "GOVERNMENT" IS NOT IN CONTROL OF CAMBODIA. PRINCE SIHANOUK DOES NOT HEAD A GOVERNMENT IN EXILE, HE IS A NON-GOVERNMENT IN EXILE. HAVE SUPPORTERS OF RESOLUTION BEFORE US GIVEN THOUGHT TO PRECEDENT THEY ARE SETTING, IN SEEKING TO HAVE UN DECIDE ISSUE OF CAMBODIAN REPRESENTATION NOT ON BASIS OF WHO ACTUALLY

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GOVERNS CAMBODIA, BUT RATHER WHO THEY WOULD LIKE TO HAVE GOVERN CAMBODIA? ...

7. IN MARCH OF 1970, PRINCE NORODOM SIHANOUK WAS REMOVED AS CHIEF OF STATE OF CAMBODIA BY A UNANIMOUS VOTE OF CAMBODIAN PARLIAMENT UNDER THE TERMS OF THE CONSTITUTION THEN IN EFFECT, THE CONSTITUTION THAT PRINCE SIHANOUK HIMSELF HAD PROCLAIMED. THE COMPLAINT AGAINST THE PRINCE

WHICH LED TO HIS REMOVAL WAS HIS OPEN AND SINCE PUBLICLY ADMITTED COMPLICITY WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES IN PROSECUTION OF THEIR WAR AGAINST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. HIS ACTIVITY INCLUDED HIS GIVING PERMISSION FOR LARGE SCALE USE OF CAMBODIAN TERRITORY BY SOUTH VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS AND NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY OVER A PERIOD OF YEARS. THIS OCCUPATION BEGAN TO SUPPLANT THE INDIGENOUS CAMBODIAN INHABITANTS, AND IN A DE FACTO MANNER, TO ANNEX AREAS OCCUPIED. HERE IS THE REAL INTERVENTION BY A FOREIGN FORCE. THIS IS THE INTERVENTION THAT BEGAN THE TRAGEDY OF CAMBODIA. . . .

8. I MIGHT NOTE THAT PRINCE SIHANOUK'S REMOVAL FROM OFFICE WAS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY ANY CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT. THE GOVERNMENT IN EXISTENCE AT THE TIME HAD BEEN CHOSEN BY THE PRINCE IN AUGUST OF PRECEDING YEAR, AND PARLIAMENT HAD BEEN ELECTED IN 1966 FROM HIS OWN POLITICAL ORGANIZATION. THIS GOVERNMENT REMAINED IN OFFICE, REITERATED ITS ADHERENCE TO ALL TREATIES AND AGREEMENT, AND MADE NO SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES IN ITS OWN COMPOSITION. . . .

9. FOLLOWING HIS REMOVAL FROM OFFICE, SIHANOUK TURNED TO AN INSURGENT GROUP WHICH HE HAD PREVIOUSLY TRIED, WITH CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS, TO SUPPRESS, THE KHMER ROUGE, AND TO THE VIETNAMESE OCCUPATION FORCES, IN AN EFFORT TO REGAIN HIS PERSONAL POWER. HE HIMSELF HAS CHOSEN TO LIVE IN PEKING. . . .

10. SITUATION AT PRESENT IS THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA IS FIGHTING ALONE, WITHOUT ASSISTANCE OF FOREIGN TROOPS OR FOREIGN ADVISERS, AGAINST A LOCAL INSURGENCY, LED, EQUIPPED, AND SUBSTANTILLY ASSISTED BY FORCES OF A FOREIGN COUNTRY, NORTH VIETNAM.

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11. GOVERNMENT OF THE KHMER REPUBLIC HAS NEVER CEASED TO MAINTAIN ITS CLEAR CONTROL OF THE MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT, THE SUPPORT OF A GREAT MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION, AND ADMINISTRATION OF CRUCIAL URBAN AREAS AND TERRITORIES IN WHICH GREATEST PORTION OF THE ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL LIFE OF KHMER PEOPLE TAKES PLACE. IT THUS COMMANDS THE RESOURCES AND ENJOYS THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE, AND CONSEQUENTLY IS IN A POSITION TO CARRY OUT THE OBLIGATIONS OF CAMBODIA UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. . . .

12. THE TERRITORY IN WHICH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AND THE KHMER ROUGE HOLD SWAY IS PRIMARILY RURAL IN CHARACTER. THE AREAS OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE MAIN FUNCTIONS OF

GOVERNMENT AND THE SOCIAL PATTERNS OF CAMBODIAN LIFE, AS WELL AS THE MAJOR MARKETS AND OTHER PORTS, ARE CLEARLY UNDER FULL GOVERNMENT CONTROL. NEUTRAL FOREIGN OBSERVERS ARE FREE TO VISIT THE AREAS UNDER PHNOM PENH CONTROL, AND DO SO AS A MATTER OF COURSE. IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT EVEN IN THOSE AREAS UNDER THE MILITARY CONTROL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE AND INSURGENT FORCES, A LARGE PART OF THE POPULATION RETAINS ITS ALLEGIANCE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KHMER REPUBLIC. THE THOUSANDS OF REFUGEES WHO FLEE THE FIGHTING IN CONTESTED ZONES GO ONLY TO TERRITORIES IN WHICH THE GOVERNMENT HAS CLEAR CONTROL.

13. IN ANY CASE, FACT THAT GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF CERTAIN PARTS OF TERRITORY OF CAMBODIA HAS BEEN INTERRUPTED BY NORTH VIETNAMESE AND INSURGENT FORCES HAS NO NECESSARY RELATIONSHIP TO QUESTION OF THE DEGREE OF EFFECTIVE AUTHORITY EXERCISED BY SELF-STYLED SIHANOUK "GOVERNMENT." THAT ENTITY, WHICH HAS LONG HAD ITS BASE IN A FOREIGN CAPITAL FAR DISTANT FROM THE TERRITORY OF CAMBODIA, HAS NOT EVEN DEMONSTRATED ITS CONTROL OVER THE INSURGENT FORCES OPERATING IN CAMBODIA. NOR IS THERE ANY INDICATION THAT THAT ENTITY CONTROLS ANY SORT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY WHICH MIGHT EXERCISE GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY IN TERRITORY UNDER THE MILITARY CONTROL OF INSURGENT AND NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES. . . .
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14. CLEARLY THERE IS MUCH DISAGREEMENT AMONG US AS TO HOW PRESENT SITUATION IN CAMBODIA CAME ABOUT, OR AS TO HOW IT SHOULD BE RESOLVED. BUT THE UNITED STATES WOULD HOPE THAT WE COULD ALL AGREE THAT A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT IS PREFERABLE TO A MILITARY SOLUTION. LET US ALL READ THE PUBLIC STATEMENTS, AND STUDY THE PRIVATE ACTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KHMER REPUBLIC, AND, ON OTHER HAND, THOSE OF PRINCE SIHANOUK, TO DETERMINE WHICH OF THE TWO IS TRULY SEEKING PEACE, WHICH OF THE TWO HAS OFFERED TO NEGOTIATE, AND WHICH OF THE TWO HAS ACCEPTED THE NEED FOR CONCILIATION. IT IS THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KHMER REPUBLIC THAT HAS REPEATEDLY STATED ITS WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. IT IS PRINCE SIHANOUK AND THE KHMER ROUGE WHO SEEK TO PROLONG THE VIOLENCE AND THE BLOODSHED. LET US NOT THEREFORE SEEK TO DISCREDIT THOSE WHO ARE SEEKING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. LET US NOT TAKE ANY ACTION WHICH CAN ONLY COMPLICATE THE SITUATION, AND FURTHER BLOCK THE PATH TO PEACE. KISSINGER

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